# kaal:claim:7322599-018

**Claim.** As a conjecture, the operative deterrent for observed misconduct in long-horizon systems is the present value of the relationship: the full premium where misconduct ends the match and its adjudication-weighted slice where it does not.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** speculative

**Holds when.**

- labeled a conjecture; an additional behavioral and equilibrium model is required

**Source quote.**

> Deriving a prediction for observed misconduct rates requires an additional behavioral and equilibrium model not supplied here. The nat- ural decomposition is that the operative deterrent in long-horizon systems is the present value of the relationship: the full premium where misconduct ends the match and its p slice where it does not.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets* (2026), 6 The regime map and the capacity prediction, Conjecture 1, page 9

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `130ee4e65fb79a9f3a96f6df22408b40c2de76e9ec8fc2bd1c68f0f6a7104333` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Refundable%20Stake%20Does%20Not%20Expand%20Deterrent%20Capacity%20in%20Long-Lived%20Delegation%20Collateral%2C%20Premia%2C%20and%20Pseudonymous%20Markets.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, economics, reputation

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