# kaal:claim:7322599-024

**Claim.** A burned entry fee cannot enter the incentive constraint as a sanction: it does not pad a later walk and affects honesty only through the participation channel of raising the premium.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- the fee's placement in this model

**Source quote.**

> What fees cannot do in this layer is enter the incentive constraint as a sanction: the fee is burned at entry, does not pad a later walk, and affects honesty only insofar as ( 12) raises the premium. That is a participation channel, and it follows from the fee’s placement in this model, not from Theorem 1 alone.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets* (2026), 7 The market layer (conditional result), page 10

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `130ee4e65fb79a9f3a96f6df22408b40c2de76e9ec8fc2bd1c68f0f6a7104333` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Refundable%20Stake%20Does%20Not%20Expand%20Deterrent%20Capacity%20in%20Long-Lived%20Delegation%20Collateral%2C%20Premia%2C%20and%20Pseudonymous%20Markets.pdf

**Topics.** economics, tokenomics, risk-and-incentives

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.