# kaal:claim:7322599-026

**Claim.** Mechanism design must distinguish relationship retention from stake captivity: an in-place sanction changes which premium enters the constraint, while a pending-claim freeze moves a case from leaky to captive treatment without converting exit misconduct into in-place misconduct.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- conditional on the maintained model

**Source quote.**

> Third, distinguish relationship retention from stake captivity: an in-place sanction changes which premium enters the constraint, while a pending-claim freeze can prevent release and move a case from leaky to captive treatment without itself converting exit misconduct into in-place misconduct.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets* (2026), 8 Design implications, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `130ee4e65fb79a9f3a96f6df22408b40c2de76e9ec8fc2bd1c68f0f6a7104333` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Refundable%20Stake%20Does%20Not%20Expand%20Deterrent%20Capacity%20in%20Long-Lived%20Delegation%20Collateral%2C%20Premia%2C%20and%20Pseudonymous%20Markets.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, institutional-design, risk-and-incentives

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