# kaal:claim:7456999-036

**Claim.** Repeated-game cooperation results require persistent identity, patient agents, observable deviations, and enforceable punishments, none of which RLRF presently establishes.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- application of repeated-game results to RLRF

**Source quote.**

> Repeated-game results (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) may become relevant if persistent identity, sufficiently patient agents, observable deviations, and enforceable punishments are independently established. RLRF presently establishes none of those conditions. Non-transferability alone is not sufficient for Sybil resistance.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Reinforcement Learning from Reputation Feedback* (2026), III.B Non-Transferability and the Inalienability Constraint, page 12

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Reinforcement Learning from Reputation Feedback (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7456999

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `01016fbbcc25cad205cebd59ea686d8dfee8ae9b632095d86ba6c9a900456a4b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Reinforcement%20Learning%20from%20Reputation%20Feedback.pdf

**Topics.** economics, reputation, research-methods

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