# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002

**Claim.** Stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, so contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance are a promising supplement for improving the duty of oversight.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- United States corporate governance
- duty of oversight

**Source quote.**

> After outlining why stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, the author provides some initial thoughts on how contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), Abstract, page 3

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, corporate-governance, governance-design

**Keywords.** dynamic-regulation, quasi-law, duty-of-oversight, stable-rules, corporate-governance

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