# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-005

**Claim.** Under Delaware law as applied in In re Citigroup, directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk and their inability to predict the future do not violate the duty of oversight, so the Caremark duty to monitor is not extended to business risk.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- Delaware law
- claims framed as failures to monitor business risk

**Source quote.**

> According to the Delaware Chancery court, directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk and their inability to predict the future did not violate directors' duty of oversight.

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), Introduction, discussing In re Citigroup, page 5

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, law-and-legal-systems

**Keywords.** caremark, business-judgment-rule, business-risk, director-liability, delaware-law

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-027
- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-023

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.