# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010

**Claim.** Directors who are inadequately informed about the expected standard of conduct will underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in riskier behavior than is desirable for the company itself.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- directors depend on counsel for fiduciary duty guidance

**Source quote.**

> Inadequately informed directors may underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in more risky behavior than is desirable for the company itself.

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), Introduction, page 5

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Failure mode.** under-informed directors take excessive risk  (family: board-and-oversight-failure)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, law-and-legal-systems, disclosure, governance-design

**Keywords.** risk-taking, director-liability, information-asymmetry, corporate-governance

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.