# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-013

**Claim.** German commentators, whose expertise German courts rely on heavily, concluded after the financial crisis that managers do not act reasonably under the German business judgment rule if the risks they take on behalf of the corporation result in the demise of the corporation.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- Germany
- post financial crisis evaluation of liability rules

**Source quote.**

> German commentators (contrary to their counterparts in the United States, German courts rely heavily on the expertise of commentators) concluded that managers do not act reasonably in terms of the German business judgment rule if risks

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), A Comparative Perspective on the Duty to Monitor, page 6

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Topics.** systemic-risk, risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, law-and-legal-systems

**Keywords.** german-law, business-judgment-rule, systemic-risk, financial-crisis, director-liability

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-024
- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-006
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-022
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-026

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
