# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014

**Claim.** The German ARAG/Garmenbeck holding is diametrically opposed to In re Citigroup, where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate the duty of oversight.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- comparison of German and Delaware case law on business risk

**Source quote.**

> This holding is diametrically opposed to the holding in In re Citigroup where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate directors' duty of oversight.

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), A Comparative Perspective on the Duty to Monitor, page 6

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** comparative-corporate-law, business-risk, delaware-law, german-law, duty-of-oversight

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-027

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.