# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-020

**Claim.** If the liability standard were lowered, directors and officers would take their increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized to engage in less risky behavior.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- a moderate liability standard for oversight breaches is adopted

**Source quote.**

> Directors and officers would take their increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized to engage in less risky behavior.

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), A Comparative Perspective on the Duty to Monitor, page 7

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, law-and-legal-systems

**Keywords.** risk-taking, director-liability, incentives, duty-of-oversight

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.