# kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-026

**Claim.** Governance adjustments made through stable rules in reaction to a systemic shock can result in suboptimal governance outcomes, market volatility, and economic loss.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- reforms enacted in the immediate aftermath of a crisis

**Source quote.**

> Governance adjustments via stable rules in reaction to a systemic shock can result in suboptimal governance outcomes, market volatility, and economic loss.

**From.** Kaal, *A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax* (2013), Dynamic Regulation, page 9

**Cite as.** Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20A%20Comparative%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Limitations%20of%20the%20Duty%20of%20Oversight%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Comment%20on%20Lisa%20Fairfax.pdf

**Failure mode.** crisis driven rulemaking producing suboptimal governance  (family: regulatory-lag)

**Topics.** regulatory-failure, economics

**Keywords.** stable-rules, systemic-shock, regulatory-failure, market-volatility

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.