# kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-003

**Claim.** Rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones the enactment of rules until rulemakers hold sufficient relevant and institution specific information, instead of proceeding by trial and error under incomplete information and bounded rationality.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- rulemakers are able to defer action
- information can in fact be accumulated ex ante

**Source quote.**

> Rather than engaging in suboptimal trial-and-error rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality, rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones enacting rules until rulemakers have sufficient relevant and institution-specific information for rulemaking

**From.** Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts* (2014), II. Dynamic Regulation, page 8

**Cite as.** Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20via%20Governmental%20Contracts.pdf

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** dynamic-regulation, bounded-rationality, incomplete-information, rule-enactment-timing

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-026

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.