# kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007

**Claim.** A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information becomes available, is often politically, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> a core tenet of incomplete contract theory – rulemakers should act when sufficient information becomes available – is often political- ly, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible

**From.** Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts* (2014), II.1 Learning Process to Improve Regulatory Information, page 10

**Cite as.** Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20via%20Governmental%20Contracts.pdf

**Failure mode.** waiting for sufficient information is not feasible  (family: regulatory-lag)

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, economics

**Keywords.** incomplete-contracts, rulemaking-timing, political-economy, information-sufficiency

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-035
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-047

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.