# kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017

**Claim.** The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for both.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- rules are assumed to be stable and not easily adaptable

**Source quote.**

> The inadaptability of rules and the stable and presumptively optimal rulemak- ing in the current regulatory framework may intensify the competition be- tween the two groups because it increases the stakes for both interest groups.

**From.** Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts* (2014), II.4 Supplementing the Regulatory Framework, page 17

**Cite as.** Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20via%20Governmental%20Contracts.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, economics

**Keywords.** special-interests, collective-action, rule-adaptability, political-economy

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-021
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-037

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.