# kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-021

**Claim.** Traditional forward looking corporate governance systems adopt backward looking perspectives only after stable and optimal rules have emerged as suboptimal and require replacement or amendment.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- traditional stable and presumptively optimal rulemaking infrastructure

**Source quote.**

> Traditional forward-looking corporate governance systems may take backward-looking perspectives if and when stable and optimal rules emerge as suboptimal, requiring replacement and/or amendment of existing regulatory solutions.

**From.** Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts* (2014), II.5 Dynamic Corporate Governance, page 19

**Cite as.** Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20via%20Governmental%20Contracts.pdf

**Failure mode.** reactive backward looking correction  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** corporate-governance, backward-looking-governance, rule-failure, regulatory-response

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