# kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-029

**Claim.** Because a governmental contract is executed only after wrongdoing has been identified and assessed, the parties can contract for governance improvements with relative precision, which reduces the amount of institution specific experimentation required and its transaction costs.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- wrongdoing has been investigated and assessed before contracting

**Source quote.**

> The assessment of corporate wrongdoing enables the parties to contract for governance im- provements with relative precision, allowing for less overall institution- specific experimentation and lower associated transaction costs.

**From.** Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts* (2014), IV.1 Improving Incomplete Contracting, page 24

**Cite as.** Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20via%20Governmental%20Contracts.pdf

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** governmental-contracts, transaction-costs, incomplete-contracts, regulatory-precision

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.