# kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035

**Claim.** Negotiation of a governmental contract produces indirect information transfers, because the government can deduce from where the corporate wrongdoer places negotiating emphasis which governance shortcomings most need remedying.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- the parties negotiate contract terms rather than accept imposed terms

**Source quote.**

> Indirect information transfers and feedback effects may exist because the government may be able to deduce from the emphasis of the corporate wrongdoer's negotiations what particular governance shortcomings need par- ticular remedying.

**From.** Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts* (2014), IV.2 Multilevel Feedback Effects, page 27

**Cite as.** Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20via%20Governmental%20Contracts.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** negotiation, feedback-effects, governmental-contracts, information-inference

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