# Abuse

`kaal:entity:abuse`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `abuse`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2012 to 2012.

**2012**

- [2097160-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Executives paid in contingent convertible bonds have an opportunistic reason to manipulate the triggering event, because conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis hands them cheap stock.
  > If SIFI executives are compensated with contingent convertible bond instruments, opportunism could lead them to manipulate the triggering event to obtain stock upon contingent convertible bonds' conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis.192
  Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160
- [2097160-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Where rules and regulatory guidance are absent, fiduciary duties are the only constraint on executives, and existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse when the payoff is substantial.
  > Without rules and regulatory guidance regarding the design and issuance of contingent convertible bonds, SIFI executives may only be curtailed by their fiduciary duties. Existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse if the payoff for executives is substantial.193
  Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160
- [2097160-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-030) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If executives influence the drafting of their own trigger, opportunism within the bounds of fiduciary duty will produce suboptimal early triggers and increase the potential for abuse, because executives can use the trigger to obtain cheap stock during a crisis.
  > Executives' opportunism and involvement in drafting the trigger could result in suboptimal early triggers in contingent convertible bonds issued to executives. If the trigger design allows executives to influence the early trigger, the suboptimal early trigger could increase the potential for abuse
  Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/abuse.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.