# Adjudication `kaal:entity:adjudication` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `adjudication`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 2 works, 2004 to 2019. **2004** - [617681-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-005) [design/argued] -- The authors propose that private ordering can design an adjudication system for European corporate law better than public ordering by Member States that are marketing their corporate laws to managers and investors abroad. > We rather propose that private ordering can better design an adjudication system than can public ordering by Member States marketing their corporate laws to managers and investors outside their borders. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-006) [mechanism/argued] -- Rule switching costs for a jurisdiction are probably higher when it must make substantial new demands on its courts in addition to changing its statutes, which raises the cost of competing with a bundled corporate law product. > Most important to the analysis in this paper, these rule switching costs are probably higher if the jurisdiction has to make substantial new demands on its courts as well as make changes to its statutes. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-007) [mechanism/argued] -- Mobility costs for a corporation are probably higher when changing the jurisdiction of incorporation means changing not only the applicable corporate law but also the courts that will apply it. > Finally, mobility costs are probably higher if changing jurisdictions of incorporation means changing not just the applicable corporate law, but also the courts that will apply that law. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters is cumbersome and confusing and creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers fluent in the language of the proceedings, which is a barrier to exporting adjudication. > Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters, however, is cumbersome and confusing, and also creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers who are fluent in the language of the proceedings. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The weak link in a bundled package offered by a civil law Member State is likely to be its system of adjudication rather than its statute. > The weak link in the bundled package offered by a civil law jurisdiction is thus likely to be its system of adjudication rather its statute. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-017) [mechanism/argued] -- Defects in a civil law jurisdiction's corporate statute, such as inadequate minority shareholder protection, are more easily fixed than defects in a judiciary that fails to apply the statute predictably and uniformly. > Problems with a civil law jurisdiction's underlying statute – for example if it gives inadequate protection for minority shareholders – are also more easily fixed than problems with a judiciary that fails to apply the statute in a predictable and uniform manner. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-030) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- For cross border enforcement the critical question is not whether a judgment will be enforced in another Member State but when: eventual enforcement is insufficient if a party has time to remove assets, and delayed injunctions can be worthless. > In many instances, the critical question is not whether a judgment will be enforced in another Member State, but when. "Eventually" is an insufficient answer if damages cannot be collected because a party has time to remove assets elsewhere. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the judiciary in many European jurisdictions is a specialized career entered shortly after university and without significant private practice experience, European judges lack the practice background that facilitates learning to adjudicate complex corporate disputes. > the judiciary is a specialized career that one enters shortly after university training and without significant experience in private practice. Lack of practice experience does not facilitate learning how to adjudicate disputes arising out of complex corporate transactions. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 - [617681-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-041) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Expert judges in national courts who cannot understand the arguments of lawyers before them or read documents written in another language may not be experts at all, so the American model of state appointed expert corporate judges does not transfer to multilingual Europe. > but in Europe "expert" judges in national courts who cannot understand the arguments of lawyers before them or who cannot read underlying documents written in another language may not be experts at all. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 **2019** - [3441904-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The cost of translating coded contractual intent into natural language has the potential to become overwhelming for the existing centralized legal infrastructure, because coded intent may be unclear and natural language intent often cannot be used for interpretation. > Coded contractual intent may be unclear and natural language intent can often not be used for interpretation. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/adjudication.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.