# Agency theory

`kaal:entity:agency-theory`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `agency-theory`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

7 claims across 4 works, 2019 to 2021.

**2019**

- [3373393-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-003) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The core agency conflicts that emanate from the separation of ownership by shareholder principals and control by manager agents cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework, because monitoring agents is inevitably costly and transaction costs abound.
  > However, the core agency conflicts emanating from the separation of ownership (shareholder principal) and control (manager agent) cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
- [3373393-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-007) [mechanism/argued] -- Agency problems originate from the lack of trust between principals and agents, which itself stems from information asymmetries and agents' opportunistic self-interested behavior.
  > Agency problems originate from the lacking trust between principals and agents.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
- [3373393-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because of bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so as to induce the agent to act in the principal's best interests.
  > it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent in order to induce the agent to act in the best interests of the principal.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
- [3373393-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-028) [mechanism/argued] -- Decentralized Autonomous Organizations have begun to challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because blockchain enables the removal of agents as intermediaries through code, peer-to-peer connectivity, crowds, and collaboration.
  > Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
- [3406323-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-007) [mechanism/argued] -- Decentralized Autonomous Organizations challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because a DAO can operate a governance structure built entirely on software, code, and smart contracts.
  > Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3411897-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-008) [mechanism/argued] -- Decentralized Autonomous Organizations challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, attacking organizational design at a fundamental level rather than merely reforming it.
  > While it is still difficult to imagine a world without governance structures facilitated by agency constructs, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897

**2021**

- [3808852-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-009) [condition/evidenced] -- Because of human shortcomings, bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so as to induce the agent to act in the principal's best interest.
  > bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries between principal and agent,7 it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent in order to induce the agent to act in the best interest of the principal.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/agency-theory.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.