{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/aktiengesetz",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:aktiengesetz",
 "name": "Aktiengesetz",
 "termCode": "aktiengesetz",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/aktiengesetz.md",
 "sha256": "8554307800787829d047560bcd3693d19915e56ea3ada569343cf0c3e804b9d1",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 1
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2010",
    "2010"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-022",
   "text": "The German and U.S. business judgment rules diverge most sharply at the German rule's fifth element, the requirement of no hazard decision or excessive risk taking, which German law presumes but allows to be rebutted.",
   "abstract": "As pointed out below, it is in this last element where the business judgment rules in the United States and in Germany diverge the most. German law presumes no hazard and excessive risk, but this presumption can be rebutted.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German rule is code based in the Aktiengesetz; the U.S. rule is case law of the state of incorporation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-035",
   "text": "Germany's 2005 introduction of the derivative suit tightened the standard of care only partially, because section 148(1) of the AktG conditions shareholder standing on holding shares worth roughly 100,000 euros, a threshold with no U.S. counterpart.",
   "abstract": "section 148(1) of the AktG requires a threshold ownership of shares totaling !100,000 (about $127,090) for shareholders to have standing to sue on behalf 174 of the corporation in German courts",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German derivative suits under section 148(1) AktG as amended by the UMAG",
    "partly counterbalanced by VorstAG liability and compensation reduction provisions"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'aktiengesetz'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}