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 "name": "Antitrust",
 "termCode": "antitrust",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-029",
   "text": "Building critical mass in the contingent capital securities market could require banks and other financial institutions to buy their competitors' contingent capital securities, which would raise ethical, antitrust and incentive concerns.",
   "abstract": "Developing a critical mass for the market in contingent capital securities could require banks and other financial institutions to purchase their competitors' contingent capital securities.533 That could raise ethical, antitrust, and incentive concerns.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where non-bank demand is insufficient to absorb issuance volumes"
   ],
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6421319-012",
   "text": "The correct response to the binding constraint cascade is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure underpinning AI production, pursued through decentralized compute networks, energy decentralization, open source models, and antitrust enforcement of compute markets.",
   "abstract": "The appropriate response is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure that underpins AI production.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "required to prevent scarcity from migrating rather than dissolving"
   ],
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-028",
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   "text": "Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.",
   "abstract": "Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy. It becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "supported by algorithmic collusion research in pricing games, Bertrand duopoly experiments, and financial trading"
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6421319-029",
   "text": "Algorithmic pricing raises margins in concentrated markets: margins increased 28 percent in local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany when both firms adopted algorithmic pricing software.",
   "abstract": "Assad and colleagues have documented that margins increased 28% in local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany when both firms adopted algorithmic pricing software.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
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   "scope_conditions": [
    "local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany",
    "both firms adopting algorithmic pricing"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-025",
   "text": "Algorithmic collusion, the convergence of independently optimizing agents on jointly welfare-reducing strategies without explicit communication, is a first-order regulatory concern in markets populated by computative agents and its incidence is likely to expand as those agents enter more market domains.",
   "abstract": "Algorithmic collusion, the convergence of independently optimizing agents on jointly welfare-reducing strategies without explicit communication, is a first-order concern in markets populated by computative agents",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to markets populated by computative agents"
   ],
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-026",
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   "text": "Because supply of any specific realization is unbounded while the quality of the generative distribution is bounded, markets for computative outputs will organize around access to generative capacity, pricing will be access-based rather than per-unit, and antitrust analysis should attach to generative capacity rather than downstream outputs.",
   "abstract": "This implies that markets for computative outputs will organize around access to generative capacity rather than around the exchange of specific outputs, that pricing will be access-based rather than per-unit, and that competition and antitrust analysis should attach to generative capacity",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
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    "holds under the computative primitive"
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 "description": "6 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'antitrust'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}