# Antitrust

`kaal:entity:antitrust`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `antitrust`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 3 works, 2012 to 2026.

**2012**

- [2061166-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Building critical mass in the contingent capital securities market could require banks and other financial institutions to buy their competitors' contingent capital securities, which would raise ethical, antitrust and incentive concerns.
  > Developing a critical mass for the market in contingent capital securities could require banks and other financial institutions to purchase their competitors' contingent capital securities.533 That could raise ethical, antitrust, and incentive concerns.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**2026**

- [6421319-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-012) [design/argued] -- The correct response to the binding constraint cascade is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure underpinning AI production, pursued through decentralized compute networks, energy decentralization, open source models, and antitrust enforcement of compute markets.
  > The appropriate response is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure that underpins AI production.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319
- [6421319-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-028) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.
  > Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy. It becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319
- [6421319-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-029) [empirical/evidenced] -- Algorithmic pricing raises margins in concentrated markets: margins increased 28 percent in local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany when both firms adopted algorithmic pricing software.
  > Assad and colleagues have documented that margins increased 28% in local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany when both firms adopted algorithmic pricing software.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319
- [6607458-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-025) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Algorithmic collusion, the convergence of independently optimizing agents on jointly welfare-reducing strategies without explicit communication, is a first-order regulatory concern in markets populated by computative agents and its incidence is likely to expand as those agents enter more market domains.
  > Algorithmic collusion, the convergence of independently optimizing agents on jointly welfare-reducing strategies without explicit communication, is a first-order concern in markets populated by computative agents
  Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458
- [6607458-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-026) [predictive/argued] -- Because supply of any specific realization is unbounded while the quality of the generative distribution is bounded, markets for computative outputs will organize around access to generative capacity, pricing will be access-based rather than per-unit, and antitrust analysis should attach to generative capacity rather than downstream outputs.
  > This implies that markets for computative outputs will organize around access to generative capacity rather than around the exchange of specific outputs, that pricing will be access-based rather than per-unit, and that competition and antitrust analysis should attach to generative capacity
  Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/antitrust.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.