# Attack cost `kaal:entity:attack-cost` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `attack-cost`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 9 claims across 3 works, 2018 to 2021. **2018** - [3125822-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-019) [empirical/argued] -- In the absolute worst case, with no safeguards at all, the price of corrupting the platform from within is a minimum of twice the total historical fees added to the system, and instituting any obvious protection raises that price steeply. > in the absolute worst- case scenario, the price to corrupt the system from within is a minimum of twice the total historical fees added to the system. If any obvious protections are instituted, the price to corrupt grows steeply. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 - [3125822-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-021) [empirical/argued] -- Acquiring 51 percent of the tokens by paying fees and winning betting pools costs roughly six times the value of the entire quantity of sem tokens in a healthy expertise, even when the bench makes no effort at all to police the incoming fees. > a reasonable estimate for the price of this attack (even when the bench makes absolutely no effort to police this action) is 6 times the value of the entire quantity of sem tokens in existence in the expertise, when the expertise is healthy, i.e., earning fees. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 - [3125822-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-022) [condition/argued] -- If good faith experts counter invest at least as fast as the malicious group, that is at a constant fraction c greater than or equal to one of the malicious investment, the malicious group can never gain more than 50 percent of the power. > assume the good-faith experts invest some constant fraction c of the malicious groups' investment ∆x at each time. If c ≥ 1then the malicious group will never gain more than 50% power. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 - [3125822-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Faking a reputable expertise tag is nearly costless: a successful tag's open record can be copied and reposted under a new name for the price of the anti denial of service fees, and the capital used to mimic fees paid into the sham tag is mostly recovered by the sham owners through the salaries they control. > easily be copied and reposted under a new tag name for the low cost of the anti-DoS fees. The capital used to mimic fees paid to the sham expertise tag is mostly recovered by the sham owners through the salaries they control. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 - [3125827-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-007) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Because at least half of the sem tokens minted when a user buys in with a fee are shared with the community that polices the application, the ability to purchase tokens does not open a profitable 51% attack; the authors claim a mathematical proof that this feature alone eliminates the incentive. > at least half of the tokens minted are shared with the community who polices the application. We provide a mathematical proof that shows this alone completely eliminates all incentives to perform the 51% attack in Appendix A.1. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 - [3125827-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because almost all other blockchains distribute perfectly fungible currency tokens through initial sales or mining, there is a clear, computable answer to how much it would cost to corrupt or destroy a chain running a proof of stake protocol on cryptocurrency stakes. > Either way, these tokens are almost always perfectly fungible currencies, so there is a clear answer to how much it would cost to corrupt or destroy blockchain running a PoS protocol based on cryptocurrency stakes. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 - [3125827-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-036) [empirical/evidenced] -- An attacker who buys sem tokens directly from the platform by sending fees must spend at least twice, and more likely six times, the entire historical value of the platform, so the griefing factor is a minimum of 2 with an average of 6. > attacker would lose a significant amount of money to achieve their goal, at least twice the entire historical value of the platform--more likely the factor would be 6 times the total value (see Appendix A.1 for a proof). So the griefing factor is a minimum of 2 with an average of 6, Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 - [3125827-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-037) [empirical/evidenced] -- Under the worst case model with no admission safeguards and no other users paying fees, a malicious group must invest at minimum twice the total sem tokens of the system to reach 50% voting power in the validation pool, because half of every fee it pays mints tokens for the existing good faith experts. > Consequently the malicious group would need to invest an absolute minimum of 2g8 , that is, double the total sem tokens of the system to gain 50% power in the system in order to outvote the rest of the good-faith experts in the validation pool. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 **2021** - [3782210-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-028) [mechanism/evidenced] -- With the balanced staking and fee-sharing necessities implemented, the cost of faking reputation is at an absolute minimum double the value of that reputation, which is how reputation is made more valuable than money. > With #e and #j implemented, the cost of faking your reputation is (at an absolute minimum) double the value of the reputation. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/attack-cost.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.