{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/aufsichtsrat",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:aufsichtsrat",
 "name": "Aufsichtsrat",
 "termCode": "aufsichtsrat",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/aufsichtsrat.md",
 "sha256": "7800d5d479933ac41cc1c5ab4d45da0ab99ca8ecf0a0b2844169e76e27d5e4f8",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 1
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2010",
    "2010"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-018",
   "text": "Codetermination makes the German supervisory board's decision making more cumbersome, so a co determined Aufsichtsrat may not respond quickly enough to fast moving events such as an escalation of portfolio risk or a liquidity crisis.",
   "abstract": "It may be difficult for a co-determined Aufsichtsrat to respond quickly to rapidly changing developments, such as an escala- tion of financial risk in a securities portfolio or a liquidity crisis.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "corporations large enough to trigger employee representation on the supervisory board",
    "employee representatives may also carry union political objectives"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-019",
   "text": "Because the Aufsichtsrat owes its duty of loyalty to the firm rather than to shareholders alone, and because non shareholder constituencies such as employees and creditors are more risk averse than diversified shareholders, German supervisory boards may take a more conservative attitude toward risk than U.S. shareholder oriented boards.",
   "abstract": "The Aufsichtsrat's legal duty of loyalty to the firm as distinct from its shareholders thus may dictate a more conservative attitude toward risk than that of a shareholder oriented board of di- rectors in the United States.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German courts treat the duty as protecting the interests of the firm, not only shareholders",
    "reinforced by codetermination"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'aufsichtsrat'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}