# Automated punishment

`kaal:entity:automated-punishment`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `automated-punishment`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 3 works, 2021 to 2021.

**2021**

- [3782203-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Automating exclusion of cheaters through smart contracts makes punishment credible and removes the infinite regress of traditional enforcement, where members would have to police those who failed to police those who failed to police cheaters.
  > Algorithms can be written which exclude members who cheat from hav- ing access to their market. Punishment for cheating becomes automated and there- fore credible. Free riding in policing can at least partly be eliminated by automation.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3799320-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-037) [mechanism/argued] -- In the DAO of DAOs, algorithms can exclude cheating members from market access, so punishment becomes automated and therefore credible, and free riding in policing is at least partially eliminated by automation.
  > By contrast, in the DAO of DAOs, algorithms can be written which exclude DAO of DAOs members who cheat from having access to their market. Punishment for cheating becomes automated and therefore credible. Free riding in policing can at least partially be eliminated by automation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3981021-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Punishment for nefarious conduct becomes credible when it is automated, and the value of a voting associate's reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in response to nefarious conduct.
  > - Punishment for nefarious conduct becomes automated and therefore credible. The CHARITYxDAO reputation staking design also enhances policing and compliance. The value of CHARITYxDAO VA reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/automated-punishment.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.