# Bail in

`kaal:entity:bail-in`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `bail-in`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2011 to 2012.

**2011**

- [1908473-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-022) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Although the EU debt write-down proposal gives regulators certainty and discretion, it could produce greater market uncertainty, raise costs, and have the unintended effect of increasing the size of financial institutions.
  > Although the concept may provide greater certainty and discretion to regulators, it could result in greater market uncertainty, which is likely to increase costs, and could have the unintended effect of actually increasing the size of financial institutions.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**2012**

- [2061166-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-023) [empirical/argued] -- The authors contend that the European Commission's suggested floor of 4 to 19 percent of risk-weighted assets in pre-qualified bail-inable debt under the targeted approach is unrealistically high.
  > The Commission suggests that the pre-qualified amount of debt could include a fixed minimum for all institutions between 4 and 19 per cent of risk-weighted assets.470 Although these numbers seem unrealistically high
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-024) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Implementing the European Commission's debt write-down proposal has the potential to increase funding costs for financial institutions and to make their funding more volatile.
  > The implementation of the debt write-down in the European Commission proposal also has the potential of increasing funding costs for financial institutions475 and could make funding more volatile.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-036) [design/argued] -- Using contingent capital as a preventative tool does not foreclose the statutory core power or the debt write-down tool within resolution; if early contractual write-down and conversion fail, authorities remain free to intervene and impose a haircut on shareholders, debt investors and other private parties.
  > Contingent capital as a preventative tool would not impede the statutory core power or debt write-down tool of bail-inables within resolution.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/bail-in.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.