{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/bank-failure",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:bank-failure",
 "name": "Bank failure",
 "termCode": "bank-failure",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/bank-failure.md",
 "sha256": "01efe4448a57879dd00e659205d3100874c69c7aa80f7c021f974006a506d7d7",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2012",
    "2012"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-008",
   "text": "Contingent capital contributes to minimizing moral hazard by internalizing bank failure costs, that is, by placing those costs on the institution's own security holders rather than on the public.",
   "abstract": "By inter- nalizing bank failure costs, contingent capital could contribute to minimizing moral hazard.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where the conversion feature actually shifts failure costs to CCS holders and shareholders"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-004",
   "text": "Purely national crisis measures proved ineffective during the financial crisis because they could not reach cross-border banking operations or contain contagion, as the failures of Lehman Brothers, Fortis, the Icelandic banks, Northern Rock and Hypo Real Estate Holding demonstrated.",
   "abstract": "national measures proved ineffective and failed to address cross-border banking operations or contagion.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "bank failures with cross-border operations",
    "2007 to 2009 financial crisis"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'bank-failure'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}