# Bankruptcy `kaal:entity:bankruptcy` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `bankruptcy`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 7 claims across 4 works, 2013 to 2018. **2013** - [2348463-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-002) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Under the regulatory framework in place at the time of writing, the threat that hedge funds' systemic risk filings could be publicly disclosed through the bankruptcy process will affect hedge funds' tactics and their role in distressed investing only marginally. > In the current regulatory framework, the threat of public disclosure of systemic risk filings by hedge funds via the bankruptcy process may only marginally affect hedge funds' tactics and their role in distressed investing. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463 - [2348463-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-034) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Systemic risk disclosures in the bankruptcy process would also not significantly change or limit hedge funds' influence in that process, nor would they protect against the misuse of confidential information. > Systemic risk disclosures in the bankruptcy process also may not significantly change or limit the influence of hedge funds in the bankruptcy process or protect against misuse of confidential information. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463 - [2348463-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Bankruptcy judges and the parties to a bankruptcy case may be unable to adequately evaluate Form PF data pertaining to a creditor, which limits the usefulness of that data in bankruptcy. > Bankruptcy judges and/or the respective parties in a bankruptcy case may be unable to adequately evaluate Form PF data pertaining to a creditor in a bankruptcy case. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463 **2017** - [3017612-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-027) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A buy-sell agreement survives bankruptcy more reliably when it is not merely executory: because bankruptcy trustees may void executory agreements, an agreement that obliges both the shareholders and the entity to buy and sell is more likely to be enforced. > Under US Law, bankruptcy trustees may void any agreement that is "executory," so to the extent a buy-sell agreement requires shareholders and the entity to buy and sell, it is more likely to survive bankruptcy. Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612 - [3067615-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-002) [definitional/argued] -- Tokens sold in an ICO are structurally different from equity: they do not generally confer ownership rights, no right to dividends, and no claim on company assets in bankruptcy, so the risk and reward profile of a token is not that of a share. > Risks and rewards of tokens differ from those of equity. Unlike token ownership, equity typically conveys a right to dividends. In the case of bankruptcy, equity owners have some claims on the assets of the company. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615 - [3067615-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- On bankruptcy or termination of the platform, token holders typically have no liquidity preference and no recourse at all once debt holders and outside creditors are satisfied, so unlike a venture capital seed investor with at least a simple liquidity preference, they typically lose everything they invested. > Again, by contrast, token holders typically lose everything they invested as they have no liquidity preference at all. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615 **2018** - [3117224-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Token holders typically receive no liquidity preference protecting them if the platform they invested in goes bankrupt or terminates. > Token holders typically do not receive a liquidity preference that would protect them in the case of bankruptcy or termination of the platform they invested in. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/bankruptcy.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.