# Basel iii `kaal:entity:basel-iii` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `basel-iii`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 5 works, 2011 to 2017. **2011** - [1806252-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-002) [design/argued] -- Because hedge funds play a large role in the credit derivatives market and that market recently failed, an increased regulatory emphasis on banks' lending exposure to hedge funds is justified. > Because of hedge funds' role in the credit derivatives market, in combination with the market's recent failure, this Article suggests that an increased emphasis on hedge fund lending exposure could be justified. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-003) [design/argued] -- Building on the increase in capital requirements for counterparty risk already suggested in Basel III, Basel III could add a charge on banks' assets based on their lending exposure to hedge funds. > Basel III could also include a charge for banks' assets based on their lending exposure to hedge funds. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-025) [design/argued] -- Basel III capital charges based on a bank's lending exposure to hedge funds could help address the threat of regulatory arbitrage. > Basel III capital charges based on a bank's lending exposure to hedge funds could help to address the threat of regulatory arbitrage. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-026) [design/argued] -- Implementing the hedge fund lending charge through Basel III would require no separate national implementation, because compliance falls on banks that have already joined the framework, so transaction costs for national regulators would be avoided. > Once the bank has signed on to join the framework, it would merely be the responsibility of the participating banks to comply with the framework. Hence, transaction costs for national regulators would be avoided. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-027) [condition/argued] -- Even combining hedge fund regulation via Basel III rules with the de minimis investment rules in Dodd-Frank could leave some issues open, and calibrating such a regulatory combination requires time and experience. > Even the combination of hedge fund regulation via rules in Basel III and de minimis investment rules in Dodd—Frank could leave open some issues. The calibration of such a regulatory combination requires time and experience. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 **2012** - [1998455-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-009) [mechanism/argued] -- Installing contingent capital can be more efficient than raising capital requirements, because the capital injection becomes available only when it is needed and only enough securities convert to recapitalize the firm. > Installing contingent capital could be more efficient than raising capital requirements because the capital injection is available only when it is needed. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-015) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Divergent national definitions of Tier 1 capital produce a distortion: financial institutions in countries with stricter definitions that exclude contingent capital appear to hold less capital and thinner capital cushions than institutions in countries with broader definitions, and investors may read that appearance as a negative attribute. > Financial institutions in countries that use stricter definitions on Tier 1 capital and do not recognize contin- gent capital as Tier 1 capital could appear to have less capital and thinner capital cushions than financial institutions in countries with broader definitions for Tier 1 capital. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [2061166-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-040) [empirical/evidenced] -- The Basel Committee rejected European Union Member State requests to allow contingent capital to satisfy the new capital buffer requirements under Basel III, deciding instead that systemically important institutions must meet heightened capital requirements with retained earnings and ordinary shares. > The Basel Committee rejected requests from EU Member States to use contingent capital to satisfy the new capital buffer requirements under Basel III. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2097160-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-018) [condition/argued] -- To be effective, early triggers must be set well above the Basel III capital requirement threshold, and capital-ratio early triggers should be independent of regulatory demands about capitalization levels. > To be effective, early triggers should be well above the threshold for capital requirements under Basel III.164 But early triggers in the form of capital ratios should be independent of regulatory demands pertaining to capitalization levels. Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 **2017** - [2957645-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-024) [design/argued] -- Contingent capital could create a regime for providing countercyclical regulatory capital that further enhances the regulatory capital requirements of the Federal Reserve and those under Basel III. > Accordingly, contingent capital could create a regime for providing countercyclical regulatory capital51 that further enhances regulatory capital requirements of the Federal Reserve52 and under Basel III.53 Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/basel-iii.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.