# Blockchain governance `kaal:entity:blockchain-governance` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `blockchain-governance`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 7 claims across 5 works, 2018 to 2021. **2018** - [3125827-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- No single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution can completely prevent independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming block production to advantage some parties over others. Any consensus protocol that relies on a permanently fixed rule set will therefore be gamed as conditions change. > In fact it is obvious there can be no single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution which completely prevents independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming the system by producing blocks with transactions that advantage some parties over others1. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 - [3125827-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Any blockchain whose soft forks are decided through private communication between famous token holding whales is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems, which at least address centralized security risks deliberately. > Any blockchain subject to such governance is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems which pointedly address centralized security risks. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 **2019** - [3441904-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocols. > Existing blockchain governance still mainly consist of forking a given chain. Even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 - [3441904-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-025) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- If a community cannot agree after a hard fork on which chain is the true chain, the result can be two blockchains competing in perpetuity, and the only viable remedy is abandoning one branch, which causes some miners to lose re-allocated transactions. > If after a hard fork, the respective community cannot agree on which chain is the true chain, e.g. the chain that provides the most likely survivable protocol, it may result in two blockchains that compete in perpetuity. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 **2021** - [3782198-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Bitcoin and Ethereum have no formal binding governance framework declaring how consensus protocols may be changed in the future, which the authors identify as a deep flaw that weakens the networks and will lead to instability. > In Bitcoin and Ethereum, there is no formal binding governance framework de- claring how the protocols for consensus might be changed in the future. This is a deep flaw which weakens these networks and will lead to instability. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782203-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-010) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because a group sometimes genuinely has no consensus to be discovered, network forking is at times inevitable rather than a governance failure that better rules could prevent. > First, that is a major problem for democracy. Sometimes there is no consensus to be had. This leads to the second conclusion that sometimes network forking is inevitable. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3808873-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-033) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Decentralized networks depend on dynamic governance because evolving blockchain protocols require updates, and the practice of hardforking that remained prevalent in the early 2020s created significant economic loss for such blockchains. > As blockchains protocols evolve in a given market, they require updates. The practice of hardforking, that was still prevalent in the early 2020s, created significant economic loss for such blockchains. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/blockchain-governance.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.