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   "text": "Fear of judicial bias operates through risk premiums: because investors and managers are uncertain how foreign judges will behave and may assume the worst, they price a decision to incorporate in another Member State higher.",
   "abstract": "Risk premiums charged by actors often reflect both bounded rationality and incomplete information, and managers and investors thus may put a higher price on a decision to incorporate in another Member State.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681",
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   "text": "Moral hazard is worsened when the financial products traded are so complex that the agents, mostly on the buy side, do not entirely understand them and trade for the principal on the basis of incomplete and asymmetric information.",
   "abstract": "The moral hazard problem is further exacerbated when the financial products involved in many of these transactions are so highly complex that the agents, mostly on the buy side, do not entirely understand them and trade for the principal based on incomplete and asymmetric information.",
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   "text": "Regulation targeted only at retail investors is misdirected, because incomplete and asymmetric information, bounded rationality, and moral hazard make it difficult even for professional and semi professional investors to discern the characteristics of highly complex instruments and hard-to-value assets.",
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   "text": "Rulemaking conducted under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality produces suboptimal outcomes that require costly rule revisions, retractions, and additional rulemaking.",
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   "text": "NIE acknowledges that transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality influence the rulemaking process, with the consequence that even optimal solutions to regulatory problems become unstable and suboptimal over time.",
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   "text": "Opportunistic behavior, transaction costs, and bounded rationality undermine comprehensive contracting, so contracting parties do not specify all of their respective obligations ex-ante because anticipating all contingencies is too costly.",
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   "text": "The bounded rationality of public rulemakers aggravates shock conditions during rulemaking, because rulemakers satisfy their own constituencies rather than all affected parties and are therefore more willing to act on incomplete information.",
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   "text": "Future financial crises may be inevitable, because globalization, financial innovation, ethical challenges, suboptimal institutional designs, and the bounded rationality of decision makers create conditions that produce crises.",
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   "text": "Rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones the enactment of rules until rulemakers hold sufficient relevant and institution specific information, instead of proceeding by trial and error under incomplete information and bounded rationality.",
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   "text": "Because transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality shape the rulemaking process, even solutions that are optimal at enactment become unstable and suboptimal over time.",
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   "text": "In the current model of stable rulemaking, path dependencies lead rulemakers to act on a boundedly rational assumption that they already control sufficient information for rulemaking.",
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   "text": "Because of bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so as to induce the agent to act in the principal's best interests.",
   "abstract": "it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent in order to induce the agent to act in the best interests of the principal.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
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   "abstract": "bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries between principal and agent,7 it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent in order to induce the agent to act in the best interest of the principal.",
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   "text": "The quantification and algorithmic optimization of human thought, feeling, and action can produce an optimization of humans that is too complex for humans to understand without the data driven algorithmic aids themselves.",
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   "text": "Big data and algorithmic data analytics enable centralized algorithmically automated systems such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon to know individuals' political preferences better than the individuals themselves.",
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   "text": "In its ultimate state, algorithmic automation negates human input in data systems altogether, because human bounded rationality creates inefficiencies and the human condition yields suboptimal outputs even when algorithmically optimized.",
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   "text": "Where human managers satisfice because further search is cognitively costly, AI2AI agents continue searching until the global optimum is reached, because additional computation is essentially free.",
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   "text": "Where human contracts remain radically incomplete because parties cannot specify responses to all future states, AI2AI agents generate, evaluate and execute functionally complete contingent plans across vast state spaces in real time.",
   "abstract": "Where human contracts remain radically incomplete because the parties cannot specify responses to all future states, AI2AI agents generate, evaluate, and execute functionally complete contingent plans across vast state spaces in real time",
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   "text": "The citation matrix functions as an implicit contract specifying value distribution whose precise terms cannot be determined with the precision the mathematical framework demands, which is an instance of the incomplete contract problem identified by New Institutional Economics.",
   "abstract": "The citation matrix C functions as an implicit contract specifying value distribution, yet the precise terms of this contract—the exact citation weights—cannot be determined with the precision the mathematical framework demands",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
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   "text": "Human managers satisfice because further search is cognitively costly, whereas AI agents continue searching until the global optimum is reached because additional computation is essentially free, which removes bounded rationality from the economic substrate.",
   "abstract": "Where human managers satisfice because further search is cognitively costly, AI2AI agents continue searching until the global optimum is reached because additional computation is essentially free.",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6421319-018",
   "text": "Bounded rationality was not a behavioral quirk but the ontological condition that made hierarchy, routines, and institutional inertia rational, so engineering it away strips the behavioral and institutional research program of its explanatory domain for the dominant mode of production.",
   "abstract": "Bounded rationality was never merely a behavioral quirk. It was the ontological condition that made hierarchy, routines, and institutional inertia rational.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to the dominant mode of production in the agentic economy"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0f4f68e56ee48bb8b2d73d3ab7fd96fa572e76c195694ffa740360704c1b172d",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-011",
   "text": "The computative agent is not a satisficer, because computational resources are capital rather than a fixed cognitive endowment, so added capacity scales the size and quality of the generable possibility space rather than easing a cognitive bound.",
   "abstract": "The computative agent is not a satisficer. Computational resources are capital rather than a fixed cognitive endowment. An increase in computational capacity increases the size and quality of the possibility space the agent can generate",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "75cca35350378eb8904866d068b5d2f3e1504629e6031457ce6c12152a88e3e8",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "25 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'bounded-rationality'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}