# Business risk

`kaal:entity:business-risk`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `business-risk`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2010 to 2013.

**2010**

- [1558614-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-027) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- In In re Citigroup the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to extend the Caremark oversight duty, which concerns monitoring for illegal conduct, into oversight liability for business risk, so an inability to predict the future and an incorrect evaluation of business risk are not breaches of a director's oversight responsibilities.
  > under the Caremark line of cases would 133 not be extended to impose oversight liability for business risk
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**2013**

- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-005) [empirical/evidenced] -- Under Delaware law as applied in In re Citigroup, directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk and their inability to predict the future do not violate the duty of oversight, so the Caremark duty to monitor is not extended to business risk.
  > According to the Delaware Chancery court, directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk and their inability to predict the future did not violate directors' duty of oversight.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-006) [condition/evidenced] -- Losses alone are not sufficient to hold directors personally liable for taking risks that lead to those losses, because risk is inherent in maximizing shareholder value.
  > Losses alone were not sufficient to hold directors personally liable for taking risks that lead to losses because risk is inherent in maximizing shareholder value.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014) [empirical/argued] -- The German ARAG/Garmenbeck holding is diametrically opposed to In re Citigroup, where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate the duty of oversight.
  > This holding is diametrically opposed to the holding in In re Citigroup where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate directors' duty of oversight.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/business-risk.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.