# Cartel

`kaal:entity:cartel`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `cartel`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 1 works, 2021 to 2021.

**2021**

- [3995709-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-019) [empirical/asserted] -- The code review industry is dominated by a cartel formed by the top five code audit firms, and that cartel creates high barriers to entry for new players in the code review market.
  > The top five code audit firms form a cartel. The cartel of the top 5 audit firms also creates high barriers to entry for new players to enter into the code review market.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709
- [3995709-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-020) [mechanism/argued] -- Cartelization of the code review industry causes significant overpricing, because clients will pay almost any price to obtain the stamp of approval from one of the top five audit firms.
  > As a result of the cartelization of the industry, most code reviews are significantly overpriced. Clients pretty much pay any price to get the stamp of approval from one of the top 5 audit firms.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709
- [3995709-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-021) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Cartel power undermines attempts by other industry players to create internal or external controls on the quality of code reviews, leaving the public with no or very weak control over the quality of the code review services it receives.
  > The cartel power also undermines attempts by other industry players to create internal or external controls on the quality of code reviews. As a result, the public has no or very weak control over the quality of code review services it receives.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709
- [3995709-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-022) [mechanism/argued] -- Because customers cannot afford to search for better priced code reviews and are forced into cartel pricing to obtain market acceptance of their products, cartelization undermines any form of downward price pressure.
  > Customers cannot afford to look for better priced code reviews and are forced into the cartel pricing to obtain market acceptance of their products. In turn, the cartelization of the market undermines any form of downward price pressure.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709
- [3995709-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Even if code review and audit firms did engage in thorough insurance underwriting and guarantees for their clients, the remedy would still fail because those firms would remain subject to the flawed and centralized legacy insurance market, which is itself dominated by a cartel of a few core players.
  > Even if code review and audit firms were to engage in a more thorough insurance underwriting and guarantee process for their clients, they would still be subject to the flawed and centralized legacy insurance market.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709
- [3995709-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the existing code review market provides no publicly transparent pricing, it arguably harms the public for the benefit of the cartel and its clients, since neither the client nor the code reviewer benefits from public scrutiny of cartel prices.
  > As such, the existing market arguably harms the public for the benefit of the cartel and its clients. In the existing system, the cartel pricing is not disclosed because both the client and code reviewer may not benefit from public scrutiny of the cartel prices.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/cartel.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.