# Central banks `kaal:entity:central-banks` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `central-banks`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 4 works, 2012 to 2021. **2012** - [1998455-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-036) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If central banks were to purchase contingent capital securities issued by systemically important institutions in the primary or secondary market as part of monetary policy, the prospect of internalizing bank failure costs would be undermined, and primary market purchases could also undermine market participants' confidence in these instruments. > If the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank, and other central banks, as part of their monetary policy, were to purchase CCS issued by SIFIs in the primary or second- ary market, the prospect of internalizing bank failure costs could be undermined. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Combining the existing prioritization of bailouts for systemically important institutions with central bank purchases of their contingent capital in a given jurisdiction would further incentivize those institutions to adopt similar risk profiles and correlate their risks. > Combining bailout prioritization with central bank CCS purchases in a given jurisdiction could further incentivize SIFIs to adopt similar risk profiles and corre- late risks. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 **2019** - [3396522-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-006) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Central bank operated wholesale payment systems are at the end of their technological life cycle, running on largely obsolete database designs and computing languages that are very expensive to maintain, which is one reason central banks are experimenting with token designs. > Central bank- operated wholesale payment systems are already at the end of their technological life cycle, using database designs and computing languages that are largely obsolete and very expensive to maintain. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-023) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Central bank price stability is elusive for two structural reasons: central banks are constantly lobbied to move money supply away from equilibrium, and even absent lobbying they face information asymmetries that prevent them from determining the optimal supply at any given moment. > Central banks are constantly being lobbied to increase or decrease money supply away from equilibrium.149 Moreover, even without lobbying, Central banks are subject to information asymmetries that do not allow them to determine the optimal amount of supply at any given point in time. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The authors qualify their own case: stable cryptocurrencies can experiment with monetary policy on an unprecedented scale only because they are insulated from real world complexities and political positioning, and that advantage shrinks once real world market factors actually apply to them. > This allows them to experiment with monetary policy tools on an unprecedented scale. Such experimentation is limited if and when real-world market factors pertain to such stable cryptocurrencies. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 **2020** - [3606663-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-038) [condition/argued] -- Conducting monetary policy through a central bank digital currency imposes a requirement on the technology layer: the underlying network protocol must enable the central bank to adjust the money supply at will and to act as lender of last resort with access to unlimited supply. > Moreover, in order to be able to conduct monetary policy with CBDC, the underlying network protocol would have to enable the central bank to adjust the money supply at will. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-040) [predictive/speculative] *(failure mode)* -- Although the public realm of coins could not exist without prior private experimentation, it is possible that the public realm will impact or even pre empt private coin development, for example if central banks attempt to censor the use of digital currencies they did not issue. > it is possible that the public realm of the coin evolution could attempt to impact or even pre- empt the private coin development and use. For example, some central banks may attempt to censor the use of non-centrally-issued digital currencies. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3808867-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-040) [predictive/argued] -- The end of the technological life cycles of legacy payment systems in the early 2020s, together with emerging payment trends, requires central banks to intensify their examination of alternative payment systems. > The end of technological life cycles of legacy systems in the early 2020s and associated emerging trends in payment systems necessitate central banks' enhanced examination of alternative payment systems. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/central-banks.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.