# Certification

`kaal:entity:certification`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `certification`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 1 works, 2013 to 2013.

**2013**

- [2317580-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-013) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Certification requirements that compel directors and officers to certify compliance with a CIA's provisions lower the procedural and enforcement hurdles for pursuing increased sanctions against noncompliant companies.
  > Certification requirements in CIAs, which require directors and officers to certify compliance with the CIA's provisions, can lower procedural and enforcement hurdles.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-014) [mechanism/evidenced] -- As the number of individuals required to certify compliance under CIAs grows, so does the potential for false certifications and the corresponding liability, including False Claims Act and criminal false statement exposure.
  > With the increased number of individuals certifying compliance with CIA provisions, the potential for false certifications and corresponding liability intensifies.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-021) [mechanism/argued] -- Certification requirements push directors to demand more detailed reports from corporate officers and to take a greater role in overseeing compliance with both the CIA and federal regulations.
  > The certification requirements can lead directors to require more detailed reports from the corporate officers and take a greater role in overseeing the company's compliance with both the CIA and federal regulations.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-027) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Boards are consistently held not liable for their companies' illegal marketing efforts even though federal law prohibits off-label marketing, but a board that certifies compliance with a CIA is certifying that the company properly monitors its sales teams' promotional activities, so CIAs contractually expand the applicable legal standard.
  > However, boards that certify compliance with a CIA are certifying that the company is properly monitoring the promotional activities of its sales teams. Through such certifications, CIAs contractually expand the applicable legal standards for boards.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/certification.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.