{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/change-of-control",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:change-of-control",
 "name": "Change of control",
 "termCode": "change-of-control",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/change-of-control.md",
 "sha256": "22a53d0201d962a0683f585b9a2b9ed221885b34121d67b4007f76fe7f2cf2c9",
 "additionalProperty": [
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   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
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   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
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   "value": 3
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2011",
    "2025"
   ]
  },
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   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-025",
   "text": "To balance constituent incentives and prevent abuse, the voting rights increase should be calibrated so that contingent capital holders obtain a majority stake only in combination with the largest institutional shareholder.",
   "abstract": "To balance the constituents' incentives and avoid abuse,194 the voting rights increase could be calibrated to give CCS holders a majority stake in the company only with, for instance, the largest institutional shareholder.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Change of control limited to the case where the first trigger failed"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-034",
   "text": "A substantial voting rights increase at the second trigger could raise the cost of contingent capital securities, with issuers demanding premiums that push primary issuance toward institutional investors interested in the change of control possibility.",
   "abstract": "Especially if the voting rights increase could reach the level of change of control over the entity, the premium charged by the issuers could rise dramatically and could result in a primary issuance to institutional investors who have an interest in the change of control possibility.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Especially where the voting rights increase can reach the level of change of control"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-033",
   "text": "Because the threat of a change of control leads leaders to take fewer risks in order to avoid triggering conversion, a contingent capital design with increased voting rights allows those leaders to act more in accordance with their moral convictions and conscience.",
   "abstract": "It could allow SIFI leaders to increasingly act in accordance with their moral convictions and conscience because the threat of change of control may influence SIFI leaders to take fewer risks to avoid triggering the conversion of CCS and a possible change of con- trol.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where conversion carries a credible threat of change of control",
    "where shareholders respond by allowing management more discretion over risk taking"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-015",
   "text": "In a change of control setting, LER issuance that favors long-term holders over other shareholders is impermissible under Revlon because it can undermine the highest bid or fragment shareholder support.",
   "abstract": "LER issuers must avoid discriminatory LER voucher reward distributions. For example, LER issuance cannot favor long-term holders over others in a bidding war. This is impermissible because such LER reward allocation could undermine the highest bid",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "company in play for a change of control",
    "competing bids present"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'change-of-control'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}