# Checks and balances `kaal:entity:checks-and-balances` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `checks-and-balances`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 9 claims across 8 works, 2012 to 2024. **2012** - [1998455-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-032) [design/argued] -- A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important institutions to lower risk taking implicitly and to achieve an indirect, institution specific form of corporate governance reform through increased checks and balances. > With a design that increases voting rights, SI- FIs could implicitly lower risk-taking and allow for a form of in- direct and institution- specific corporate governance reform, i.e., increased checks and balances. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 **2020** - [3652481-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Kaal accepts that the arguments against on chain governance remain strong: in an off chain model miners supply checks and balances over protocol changes, and on chain governance arguably removes those checks and balances. > Despite the ever-widening need for on-chain governance solutions, arguments against on-chain governance remain strong. In an off- chain governance model, miners provide checks and balances on power over protocol changes. On-chain governance arguably removes such checks and balances. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 - [3709041-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-004) [mechanism/asserted] -- Power in a blockchain system is exercised through the consensus protocol, which places control of data with multiple networked parties and thereby creates checks and balances that prevent any single vested interest from controlling the system. > Power is exercised by way of blockchain's consensus protocol. The consensus protocol enables the control of data by multiple networked parties. It facilitates a system of checks and balances that prohibits any vested interest and control of the system. Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041 **2021** - [3782193-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-037) [mechanism/argued] -- The separation of powers works because it makes each branch's power derive from the others, harnessing the natural human competitive impulse to stop any branch from usurping power not enumerated in the Constitution, which is what the checks and balances prevent. > In the cyclical system, the powers of each branch derive from the others. The natural human competitive impulse is har- nessed to prevent any branch from usurping power not enumerated in the Constitu- tion, the checks and balances to prevent centralization of power. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782193-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-038) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When the executive branch is given more centralizing power during a crisis, or simply takes it, the mechanism for removing that power once the threat has passed has rarely been followed. > When the executive branch is given more centralizing power during a crisis, or simply takes it, the mechanism for removing that power when the threat is over has rarely been followed. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782205-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-008) [condition/asserted] -- Keeping decentralized networks running productively requires a dynamic design with checks and balances combined with the incentive design insights of game theory. > A dynamic design with checks and balances and the incentive design insights of game theory are necessary to keep these networks running productively. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205 - [3808867-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-030) [mechanism/argued] -- Because a decentralized system has a blockchain based quasi precedent nature with a human backstop, it enables built in checks and balances capable of supporting resistance even to apocalyptic takeovers of algorithmic systems that would remove human presence to optimize efficiency. > Because of its blockchain-based quasi- precedent nature with a human backstop, the decentralized system enables built-in checks and balances that can support resistance to even the most apocalyptic applications and takeover of algorithmic systems Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 - [3981021-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-018) [mechanism/argued] -- On chain governance takes the donation out of the hands of the individual donor, who may one sidedly or mistakenly allocate assets, and puts the asset allocation and policing decisions into the hands of the community of voting associates. > the donation out of the hands of the individual donor (who may one-sidedly or mistakenly allocate assets to further the donor's donative intent). Instead, the asset allocation and policing decisions are put into the hands of the community of CHARITYxDAO VAs. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021 **2024** - [4685567-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because Impact 1.0 entrusted individual donors rather than donor collectives with identifying which problems to solve, individual philanthropists can reshape underfunded causes according to their own ideals without meaningful checks and balances or crowd wisdom. > Individual philanthropists can leverage underfunded causes and reshape them according to their ideals without significant checks and balances or crowd wisdom considerations. Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/checks-and-balances.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.