# Co investment

`kaal:entity:co-investment`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `co-investment`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 3 works, 2016 to 2021.

**2016**

- [2714974-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-015) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Co-investment arrangements become problematic when a fund grants a co-investment opportunity in exchange for a future or increased fund commitment and the practice is not adequately disclosed, especially where the fund's governing documents would prohibit the allocation.
  > If such private fund advisers' practices are not adequately disclosed, co-investments can often be problematic.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974

**2017**

- [2959730-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-013) [mechanism/argued] -- The new fee structure also results from fund managers foregoing market rate management fees, larger investors requiring reduced management fees as a condition of investing, and side-by-side co-investment vehicles charging less than 2% management fees.
  > The new fee structure is also the result of fund managers foregoing market rate management fees, larger investors requiring reduced management fees to induce investment, side-by-side vehicles attracting investors in the co-investment entities by charging less than 2% management fees
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730

**2021**

- [3949098-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-038) [definitional/argued] -- The key difference from the traditional venture capital model is that the DAOIC only makes its investment choices public and never provides investment analysis, so public co purchases are entirely voluntary.
  > The key difference from the traditional VC model is that even for the co-purchases through the market, the DAOIC only makes their investment choices public. The co-purchases by the public are entirely voluntary, the DAOIC never provides investment analysis etc.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/co-investment.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.