# Collective action problem

`kaal:entity:collective-action-problem`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `collective-action-problem`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 2 works, 2012 to 2013.

**2012**

- [2029983-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Harmonization invites its own defeat by creating an incentive for rogue jurisdictions to attract, into their legal systems, the private actors who do not agree with the harmonized rule.
  > Third, harmonization invites efforts to undermine harmony by "rogue" jurisdictions that seek to benefit by attracting to their legal systems private actors who do not agree with the harmonization.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**2013**

- [2273857-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-020) [mechanism/argued] -- Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem, and as a consequence regulatory oversight is never constant.
  > Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem. As a result, regulatory oversight is never constant.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-021) [mechanism/evidenced] -- In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors.
  > In the competition to shape policies and attain the most favorable conditions for themselves via rulemaking, small and well- organized special interest groups (such as the financial industry) dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors).
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-022) [mechanism/evidenced] -- During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest groups in rulemaking.
  > During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-023) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted in quick succession.
  > Following crises, the process is reversed and regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium. As a result of this dichotomy, reform and deregulatory legislation are often enacted in quick succession.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-053](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-053) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The core problem for financial regulation is timing: governance improvements are not enacted before crises when they are most needed, because the collective action problem makes financial regulation mostly reactive and tied to business cycles.
  > A core problem for financial regulation is its timing. Governance improvements are not enacted when they are most needed - before crises. Rather, because of the collective action problem, financial regulation is mostly reactive, following business cycles.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/collective-action-problem.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.