{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/collective-action",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:collective-action",
 "name": "Collective action",
 "termCode": "collective-action",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/collective-action.md",
 "sha256": "652c3b98e3a7aadcf0261a0b6b00afe1d3938d6c91dc399ca1ff09e7a9182133",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 19
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 9
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2011",
    "2025"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-010",
   "text": "Contingent capital offers only limited protection against information asymmetries, principal and agent conflicts, and collective action problems, so it cannot by itself prevent economic failure.",
   "abstract": "Contingent capital can only limitedly protect against information asymmetries, principal/agent issues, and collective action problems.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-013",
   "text": "Letting national regulators keep their existing Tier 1 capital definitions creates a collective action problem: countries with stricter definitions appear to have less capital and thinner cushions than countries with broader ones.",
   "abstract": "This creates collective action problems. A country that uses stricter definitions of Tier 1 capital could appear to have less capital and thinner capital cushions than banks in countries with broader definitions for Tier 1 capital.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Applies where EU wide harmonization of the Tier 1 definition is absent"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-037",
   "text": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.",
   "abstract": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-038",
   "text": "During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "during and after crises"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-039",
   "text": "The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking are likely to persist, which makes alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking more relevant.",
   "abstract": "The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking (Coffee 2012) are likely to persist, making alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking even more relevant.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004",
   "text": "Dynamic elements function as an economizing device: they address the scarcity of regulatory resources and lower the cost of rulemaking by curtailing the collective action problem in rulemaking, the resulting regulatory cycles, and trial and error rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic elements in the regula- tory infrastructure can be conceptualized as an economizing device that addresses the scarcity of regulatory resources and lowers the cost of rule- making by curtailing the effects of a classic collective action problem in rule- making, resulting regulatory cycles",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008",
   "text": "Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.",
   "abstract": "Because rulemak- ing is subject to regulatory cycles22 and a classic collective action problem23, rules are generally not enacted when appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017",
   "text": "The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for both.",
   "abstract": "The inadaptability of rules and the stable and presumptively optimal rulemak- ing in the current regulatory framework may intensify the competition be- tween the two groups because it increases the stakes for both interest groups.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rules are assumed to be stable and not easily adaptable"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-027",
   "text": "The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than from independent causes.",
   "abstract": "The collective action problem of rulemaking, problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-028",
   "text": "Adaptive rulemaking reduces the collective action problem because with fewer stable rules, latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence a continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "Adaptive rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because with fewer stable rules latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence the continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rulemaking uses institution specific, decentralized, and timely information",
    "fewer stable rules"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-030",
   "text": "Regulation is mostly reactive and follows business cycles rather than preempting crises, because of the collective action problem of regulation, path dependencies, and political inertia, so rules arrive when governance improvements are least available.",
   "abstract": "Because of the collective action problem of regulation, path dependencies, and political inertia, among many other reasons, regulation is mostly reactive, following business cycles and not preemptive, e.g. enacted before crises when governance improvements are most needed.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-020",
   "text": "The historically evolved rulemaking infrastructure could cope with its own collective action problems, regulatory cycles, and trial-and-error rulemaking without major disruption because the scope of regulatory issues was limited and institutional designs were consensus driven.",
   "abstract": "issues.80 Because of the limited scope of regulatory issues and the need for consensus- driven institutional designs, the historically evolved infrastructure for rulemaking could cope with its inherent collective action problems,81 regulatory cycles,82 and trial-and-error",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "small, stable, less interconnected societies with limited upward mobility",
    "limited and readily identifiable sets of regulatory issues"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-028",
   "text": "The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules themselves, not from unrelated institutional defects.",
   "abstract": "problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.108 Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the use of institution-specific,",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "regulatory regimes whose outcomes are stable rather than adaptive"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-029",
   "text": "Adaptive rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because when there are fewer stable rules, latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence a continuously and timely adapting process.",
   "abstract": "rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because with fewer stable rules latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence the continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rulemaking processes that incorporate dynamic and adaptive elements",
    "presence of organized interest groups competing for influence"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-034",
   "text": "A core problem for most regulation is its inaccurate and delayed timing, which follows from the collective action problem of regulation, path dependencies, and political inertia rather than from any single institutional defect.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic elements in rulemaking can help optimize the timing of rule enactment. A core problem for most regulation is its inaccurate and delayed timing. Because of the collective action problem of regulation, path dependencies, and political inertia, among",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "most regulation in the existing framework",
    "regulation that follows business cycles rather than preceding crises"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-040",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3266953-040",
   "text": "The combined efficiencies of the DAO model suggest that DAO businesses could overcome collective action problems and outcompete existing internet based businesses such as Uber.",
   "abstract": "The combined efficiencies of DAOs over existing businesses suggest that DAO businesses could effectively overcome collective action problems and outcompete internet-based businesses such as Uber.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAO infrastructure hosting decentralized companies"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "781758dea356e55d79c73ad7f1debe7c83de398bd1cd9e0a9a6c2802f276b4c0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-001",
   "text": "Centralized coordination of behavior for the common good risks undermining individual effort, whereas blockchain technology's autonomous and anonymous decentralized coordination of individual action can deliver common good outcomes without suppressing individualism and its welfare enhancing effects.",
   "abstract": "While centralized common good coordination of human behavior risks undermining individual effort, blockchain technology's autonomous and anonymous decentralized network coordination of individual human action can help overcome the threat to individualism and its welfare enhancing effects.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies where common good objectives require coordinating many individuals"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5216a7bca45a48e3bef11ec524936e66af737c0fd66271e9f6866dc20a4482cc",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-038",
   "text": "The r/place experiment showed that anonymous groups can self correct: each time a hate symbol such as a swastika appeared on the shared canvas, it was replaced with something more positive.",
   "abstract": "In the end, however, each time a hate symbol cropped up, it was replaced with something more positive.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on the r/place experiment run from April 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-030",
   "text": "A DAO is defined for the Codex as a collective of identities pursuing a common goal through a decentralized and transparent decision making process, a definition that turns on process rather than on legal form.",
   "abstract": "(DAO) is a collective of Identities that pursues a common goal through a decentralized and transpar-",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "19 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'collective-action'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}