# Collective procedures

`kaal:entity:collective-procedures`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `collective-procedures`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 1 works, 2012 to 2012.

**2012**

- [2029983-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-016) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.
  > Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983
- [2029983-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-017) [mechanism/argued] -- The requirement that each plaintiff show individual reliance, followed in most jurisdictions outside the United States, is not merely a substantive difference: it undermines collective litigation because class procedures work only when plaintiffs share common questions of law and fact.
  > This difference in substantive law has an impact on procedural issues because class action lit- igation and collective procedures are easier if plaintiffs in the class share common questions of law and fact.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983
- [2029983-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Despite signs of movement in that direction, there is as yet no genuine European substitute for the U.S. securities class action brought under the fraud-on-the-market theory.
  > There are some signs that European law could be moving in this direction, although thus far there is no genuine Europe- an substitute for the U.S. securities class action under the fraud-on-the-market theory.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983
- [2029983-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German KapMuG does not relieve trial judges of deciding the legal issues in every individual case, so it remains administratively burdensome even though its model case judgment binds the trial courts.
  > The KapMuG, how- ever, does not discharge the trial judges from addressing the legal issues in each and every case individually.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/collective-procedures.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.