# Collective wisdom

`kaal:entity:collective-wisdom`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `collective-wisdom`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2021 to 2021.

**2021**

- [3949098-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If the public fails to purchase the capped amount of a token opportunity, the DAOIC must sacrifice its own liquidity and buy the remaining part of the sale, so firm commitment underwriting turns a collective misjudgment of public demand into a capital obligation.
  > Should the public fail to purchase the capped amount of the token opportunity, the DAOIC will have to sacrifice its own liquidity and commit to buy the remaining part of the token opportunity sale.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098
- [3962614-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-039) [design/argued] -- Because the public co purchases alongside DAO investment club members and expects to pay for the right to benefit from the collective wisdom of those members and the deal pipeline they generate, the public should expect to pay the usual two and twenty fees.
  > Because the public co-purchases with the DAOIC members and expects to pay a price for the right to benefit from the collective wisdom of the DAOIC members and the deal pipeline they can together generate, the public should expect to pay the usual 2/20 fees.
  Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614
- [3962614-042](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-042) [mechanism/argued] -- The collective wisdom of DAO investment club members helps hedge against purchase risk, and because decentralized governance with loosely and tightly coupled votes will very likely make all tightly coupled votes unanimous, no member loses reputation NFTs.
  > The collective wisdom of DAOIC members helps hedge against purchase risk. Moreover, because the applicable decentralized governance with loosesly and tightly coupled votes will very likely make all tightly coupled votes unanimous, no DAOIC member loses RNFTs
  Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/collective-wisdom.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.