# Community audits

`kaal:entity:community-audits`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `community-audits`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2019 to 2021.

**2019**

- [3441904-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-039) [mechanism/argued] -- Community driven audits work in DAOs and rarely in centralized systems because the users of the system typically know best how to assess other members, whereas centralized incentive design does not enable incorruptible internal controls.
  > The decentralized nature of DAOs enhances efficiency of coordination because the users of the system, e.g. DAO members, typically know best how to assess other users / DAO members.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2021**

- [3981021-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-018) [mechanism/argued] -- On chain governance takes the donation out of the hands of the individual donor, who may one sidedly or mistakenly allocate assets, and puts the asset allocation and policing decisions into the hands of the community of voting associates.
  > the donation out of the hands of the individual donor (who may one-sidedly or mistakenly allocate assets to further the donor's donative intent). Instead, the asset allocation and policing decisions are put into the hands of the community of CHARITYxDAO VAs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021
- [3981021-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-020) [design/argued] -- In contrast to existing legacy structures that incentivize delay and hoarding, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to release the endowed assets immediately once the work for the donation has been finished.
  > In contrast to the existing legacy structures, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to immediately release the endowed assets if and when the work for the donation has been finished.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021
- [3981021-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Community audits enable enhanced efficiency of coordination because voting associates, with their highly specialized philanthropic skillsets, are ideally positioned to identify other experts in philanthropy.
  > governance structure of the CHARITYxDAO enables enhanced efficiency of coordination because the VAs in the CHARITYxDAO, with their unique and highly specialized skillsets in the context of philanthropy, are ideally positioned to identify other experts in philanthropy.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/community-audits.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.