# Competitiveness

`kaal:entity:competitiveness`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `competitiveness`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 1 works, 2012 to 2012.

**2012**

- [2061166-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-005) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because most national crisis responses took the form of public bail-outs adopted without broad international consensus, they increased the threat of international regulatory arbitrage and damaged the global competitiveness of national financial markets.
  > Most national measures took the form of public bail-outs without broad international consensus,44 thereby increasing the threat of international regulatory arbitrage as well as negatively impacting the global competitiveness of national financial markets.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-007) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Even the residual national discretion to set countercyclical buffers between 2.5 and 5 percent is misleading, because a Member State such as the United Kingdom is unlikely to sustain a 5 percent buffer while Germany requires only 2.5 percent and thereby hands German banks a competitive advantage.
  > The Commission proposal explicitly allows Member States to implement countercyclical buffers of up to 5%, but limits mutual recognition to the 2.5% ceiling. Even in these instances, the proposed discretion may be misleading.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German bank levy is internally inconsistent because financial institutions without systemic relevance must contribute to the reorganization fund yet are ineligible to receive support payments from it.
  > The German levy system is problematic because financial institutions without systemic relevance are required to contribute to the fund, yet are not able to receive fund support payments.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-039) [normative/argued] -- Given the European initiatives on contingent capital and the nascent European market in contingent capital securities, the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve would be well advised to consider implementing contingent capital standards.
  > Given the European initiatives on contingent capital and the nascent market in European contingent capital securities, the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve would be well advised to consider implementing contingent capital standards.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/competitiveness.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.