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 "name": "Conflicts of interest",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "value": [
    "2012",
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-020",
   "text": "A mandatory contingent capital issuance regime induces institutions to buy their competitors' securities to satisfy regulatory obligations rather than for economic reasons, and the resulting cross holdings among systemically important institutions undermine the ability of contingent capital to limit systemic risk and contagion.",
   "abstract": "A detrimental result of such a practice could be CCS cross holdings among SIFIs. Cross holdings of CCS by SIFIs could undermine the effectiveness of CCS and its ability to limit systemic risk and contagion.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "under a regime requiring mandatory CCS issuance",
    "where SIFIs are permitted to purchase each other's CCS"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-021",
   "text": "Where institutions hold each other's contingent capital and share similar risk profiles, they will be hesitant after conversion to vote for necessary organizational changes at a competitor or otherwise exercise their voting rights, because they are similarly exposed and may face reciprocal voting power.",
   "abstract": "With sim- ilar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities, SIFIs could be hesitant to vote for necessary organizational changes or otherwise exercise their voting rights on a competitor after conversion of CCS into equity.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where SIFIs hold similar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities",
    "especially where cross holdings are reciprocal"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-022",
   "text": "Absent cross holdings, the opposite conflict arises: institutions holding a competitor's converted contingent capital could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of that competitor.",
   "abstract": "Without CCS cross holdings, SIFIs could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of the competitor if a con- version to equity should have been triggered.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where a SIFI holds a competitor's CCS without a reciprocal position",
    "after a conversion to equity has been triggered"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2337268-020",
   "text": "Mandatory disclosure of referral compensation, related person status of brokers and dealers, and soft dollar benefits is designed to defuse conflicts of interest arising when an adviser runs several types of business and services.",
   "abstract": "investment advisers must disclose compensation given or received for client referrals,55 related persons status of brokers and dealers,56 and soft dollar benefits, i.e., research or other products and services received in connection with client transactions.57",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers filing Form ADV Part 1A"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7075ce35282a8ee75b81ae3dec0e19f68631beae7f3c3a00ab2827538dc9e302",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-015",
   "text": "Co-investment arrangements become problematic when a fund grants a co-investment opportunity in exchange for a future or increased fund commitment and the practice is not adequately disclosed, especially where the fund's governing documents would prohibit the allocation.",
   "abstract": "If such private fund advisers' practices are not adequately disclosed, co-investments can often be problematic.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies where limited partners are also co-investors",
    "turns on adequacy of disclosure and the fund's governing documents"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-019",
   "text": "The traditional mutual fund governance model, in which one board serves multiple discrete funds within a sponsor's group, is subject to significant oversight challenges.",
   "abstract": "serving as a single board for multiple discrete funds (Morley & Curtis 2010)). The traditional governance model is, thus, subject to significant oversight challenges (Krug (2016)).",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "traditional single board mutual fund complexes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b5c92186260d4a8499a14f81ee24ace093b24e7740af3effcd1c526fa4fa221e",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-023",
   "text": "The inherent conflict of interest facing an adviser who simultaneously runs a mutual fund and a hedge fund is an important limiting factor on the continued rise of side-by-side management.",
   "abstract": "An important limiting factor in the steady rise of side-by-side management is the inherent conflict of interest for the investment manager (SEC (2003), Chen & Chen (2009) and Cici et al. (2010)).",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "side-by-side management of a mutual fund and a hedge fund by the same adviser"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2992962-039",
   "text": "Because no conceivable way exists to permanently hide an arbiter's reputation from the arbiter in an open system, the corruption risk created by high reputation arbiters becoming valued counselors for disputants is an insoluble problem with the authors' own proposal.",
   "abstract": "Because no conceivable way exists to permanently hide an arbiter's reputation from the arbiter in an open system, this is an insoluble problem with the proposal.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "open reputation systems for anonymous arbiters"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "80b92e67594394e38af41b769327936833de8e25d6cf3def966a6ba13bc83d17",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-034",
   "text": "Conflicts of interest from DAOIC members participating on the public side of a deal are minimized because the loosely coupled reputation staking vote and its transition to a tightly coupled vote are transparent to the public.",
   "abstract": "However, such practices are rather limited because of the transparent nature of the loosely coupled RNFT voting on a particular deal and the transition to tightly coupled voting.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "loosely coupled votes on particular deals are publicly visible"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-029",
   "text": "Traditional golden leash arrangements pay activist-nominated directors and generate conflicts of interest, whereas LER offers non-transferable utility-only rewards that induce activists to withdraw nominations without any cash flowing to directors.",
   "abstract": "Unlike traditional golden leash arrangements, which may involve financial payments to activist-nominated directors and raise conflicts of interest,116 LER offers non-transferable, utility-only voucher rewards to encourage activists to withdraw nominations",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "settlement context with an activist investor"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "10 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'conflicts-of-interest'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}