# Conflicts of interest `kaal:entity:conflicts-of-interest` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `conflicts-of-interest`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 7 works, 2012 to 2025. **2012** - [1998455-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A mandatory contingent capital issuance regime induces institutions to buy their competitors' securities to satisfy regulatory obligations rather than for economic reasons, and the resulting cross holdings among systemically important institutions undermine the ability of contingent capital to limit systemic risk and contagion. > A detrimental result of such a practice could be CCS cross holdings among SIFIs. Cross holdings of CCS by SIFIs could undermine the effectiveness of CCS and its ability to limit systemic risk and contagion. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-021) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Where institutions hold each other's contingent capital and share similar risk profiles, they will be hesitant after conversion to vote for necessary organizational changes at a competitor or otherwise exercise their voting rights, because they are similarly exposed and may face reciprocal voting power. > With sim- ilar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities, SIFIs could be hesitant to vote for necessary organizational changes or otherwise exercise their voting rights on a competitor after conversion of CCS into equity. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-022) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Absent cross holdings, the opposite conflict arises: institutions holding a competitor's converted contingent capital could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of that competitor. > Without CCS cross holdings, SIFIs could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of the competitor if a con- version to equity should have been triggered. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 **2013** - [2337268-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-020) [design/argued] -- Mandatory disclosure of referral compensation, related person status of brokers and dealers, and soft dollar benefits is designed to defuse conflicts of interest arising when an adviser runs several types of business and services. > investment advisers must disclose compensation given or received for client referrals,55 related persons status of brokers and dealers,56 and soft dollar benefits, i.e., research or other products and services received in connection with client transactions.57 Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 **2016** - [2714974-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-015) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Co-investment arrangements become problematic when a fund grants a co-investment opportunity in exchange for a future or increased fund commitment and the practice is not adequately disclosed, especially where the fund's governing documents would prohibit the allocation. > If such private fund advisers' practices are not adequately disclosed, co-investments can often be problematic. Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 - [2715083-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The traditional mutual fund governance model, in which one board serves multiple discrete funds within a sponsor's group, is subject to significant oversight challenges. > serving as a single board for multiple discrete funds (Morley & Curtis 2010)). The traditional governance model is, thus, subject to significant oversight challenges (Krug (2016)). Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 - [2715083-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-023) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The inherent conflict of interest facing an adviser who simultaneously runs a mutual fund and a hedge fund is an important limiting factor on the continued rise of side-by-side management. > An important limiting factor in the steady rise of side-by-side management is the inherent conflict of interest for the investment manager (SEC (2003), Chen & Chen (2009) and Cici et al. (2010)). Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 **2017** - [2992962-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-039) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because no conceivable way exists to permanently hide an arbiter's reputation from the arbiter in an open system, the corruption risk created by high reputation arbiters becoming valued counselors for disputants is an insoluble problem with the authors' own proposal. > Because no conceivable way exists to permanently hide an arbiter's reputation from the arbiter in an open system, this is an insoluble problem with the proposal. Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962 **2021** - [3949098-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-034) [mechanism/argued] -- Conflicts of interest from DAOIC members participating on the public side of a deal are minimized because the loosely coupled reputation staking vote and its transition to a tightly coupled vote are transparent to the public. > However, such practices are rather limited because of the transparent nature of the loosely coupled RNFT voting on a particular deal and the transition to tightly coupled voting. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 **2025** - [5583610-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-029) [design/argued] -- Traditional golden leash arrangements pay activist-nominated directors and generate conflicts of interest, whereas LER offers non-transferable utility-only rewards that induce activists to withdraw nominations without any cash flowing to directors. > Unlike traditional golden leash arrangements, which may involve financial payments to activist-nominated directors and raise conflicts of interest,116 LER offers non-transferable, utility-only voucher rewards to encourage activists to withdraw nominations Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/conflicts-of-interest.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.