# Contingent capital limits

`kaal:entity:contingent-capital-limits`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `contingent-capital-limits`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2011 to 2011.

**2011**

- [1908473-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Contingent capital offers only limited protection against information asymmetries, principal and agent conflicts, and collective action problems, so it cannot by itself prevent economic failure.
  > Contingent capital can only limitedly protect against information asymmetries, principal/agent issues, and collective action problems.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473
- [1908473-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Existing proposals for implementing contingent capital do not explain how they would address the information asymmetries and principal and agent problems that may lie at the core of the credit crisis.
  > Although contingent capital has many beneficial attributes, existing proposals for implementing contingent capital are unclear as to how they will address information asymmetries and principal/agent problems.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473
- [1908473-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Switching to contingent capital financing may reinforce rather than reduce risk incentives, and whether the risk incentives generated by contingent capital outweigh its risk reduction potential remains unresolved.
  > In effect, however, switching to CCS financing could reinforce risk incentives. Additional research may be needed to determine if risk incentives generated by CCS113 may outweigh their potential for risk reduction.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/contingent-capital-limits.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.