{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/control-premium",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:control-premium",
 "name": "Control premium",
 "termCode": "control-premium",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/control-premium.md",
 "sha256": "8c3a2b455bc4c4a653e11ca0fc56df1f4277122ca7e6229fb15edc6d6779b088",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 1
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2017",
    "2017"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3017612-025",
   "text": "Drag-along rights raise the price the majority can obtain because a buyer facing the prospect of continuing with remaining minority shareholders would otherwise discount its offer for the majority stake.",
   "abstract": "Drag-along rights allow majority shareholders to maximize the chance of receiving full value for their shares because the prospect of having to work with the remaining minority shareholders may lead an interested party to offer a discounted price for the majority stake.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "sale of a majority stake in a closely held corporation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "33821db406f92efbe1698fbaed37687595c13b7ce5463b4a879df679fd4af1ac",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3017612-028",
   "text": "Standstill agreements defraud shareholders who are not parties to them in two distinct ways: by violating the shareholder's right to the best available merger or transaction and by discouraging unsolicited tender offers in which a significant control premium could be realized.",
   "abstract": "standstill agreements defraud shareholders not privy to the agreement in two ways: (1) by violating a shareholder's right to the best available merger or transaction, and (2) by discouraging unsolicited tender offers where a significant control premium can be realized.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "standstill agreements binding only some shareholders",
    "applying the Schreiber v. Carney definition of fraud"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "33821db406f92efbe1698fbaed37687595c13b7ce5463b4a879df679fd4af1ac",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'control-premium'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}