# Corporate governance reform `kaal:entity:corporate-governance-reform` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `corporate-governance-reform`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 1 works, 2017 to 2017. **2017** - [2922176-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Reforms that increase executive accountability to shareholders and increase shareholder control over executives do not solve the problem of corporate short-term focus. > Increasing the accountability of corporate executives to shareholders and increasing shareholder control over executives does not address the problem of short-term focus. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Top-down corporate governance reform measures rarely, if ever, produce genuine change in the governance or culture of firms, and are commonly met with indifference, skepticism, or hostility from management. > In practice, top- down corporate governance reform measures rarely, if ever, result in a genuine change in the governance and culture of firms. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Much corporate governance reform consists of repackaging old content under new or revised labels rather than introducing new governance. > Corporate governance reform often takes place by repackaging old content with new or revised labels. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Corporate governance intermediaries such as lawyers, accountants, auditors and consultants respond to governance requirements with minimum compliance, applying minimal effort for maximum compliance. > Corporate governance intermediaries often satisfy corporate governance requirements through minimum compliance with the rules and regulations. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Corporate governance initiatives designed to encourage long-term thinking rarely work as policymakers expect them to. > Corporate governance initiatives that encourage long-term thinking rarely work as expected by policymakers. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Even after recent reforms, the corporate governance framework remains framed in terms of hierarchy, which is why it fits poorly with looser and unmediated stakeholder relationships. > The corporate governance framework is still framed in terms of hierarchy, even after recent reforms. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Contemporary corporate governance reforms are unlikely to work as policymakers and regulators intend, because experts agree improvement is needed but disagree widely on what good corporate governance is or how to achieve it. > Contemporary corporate governance reforms are unlikely to work as intended by policymakers and regulators. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 - [2922176-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-038) [empirical/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The corporate governance frameworks developed in the 2000s had little or no impact on the performance of listed companies during the financial crisis, and the number, scale, and effects of corporate scandals are not diminishing. > Contemporary corporate governance frameworks developed in the 2000s had little or no impact on the performance of listed companies during the last financial crisis. Moreover, the number, scale, and effects of corporate scandals and economic failures do not appear to be diminishing. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/corporate-governance-reform.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.